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Abstract 
Purpose- With the recent financial crisis and reduction of foreign aid by donor countries, the aid-
institutions debate is shifting to how aid instability affects governance in developing countries. 
We engage the policy debate by assessing the role of foreign aid instability on governance 
dynamics in fifty three African countries for the period 1996-2010.  
 
Design/methodology/approach- An autoregressive endogeneity-robust Generalized Methods of 
Moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of standard errors and standard 
deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors and 
bilateral aid. Principal Component Analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: 
political governance (voice & accountability and political stability/non violence), economic 
governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of 
law and corruption-control) and general governance (political, economic and institutional 
governance). 
 
Findings- Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, 
especially political and general governance.  
 
Practical implications- In the presence of foreign aid instability, governments could be 
constrained to improve governance standards in exchange for, or anticipation of greater 
dependence on local tax revenues. Moreover, bundling governance indicators improves insights 
into how macroeconomic variables affect governance. This is essentially because, while aid 
instability improves general governance, for the most part it is not consistently for economic and 
institutional governance.  
 
 Originality/value- The paper has contributed to the aid-institutions’ literature by examining how 
aid instabilities affect an aggregate index of governance dynamics in Africa.  
 
JEL Classification: C53; F35; F47; O11; O55 
Keywords: Instability; Foreign aid; Governance; Development; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
 The recent financial crisis has led to a decline in development assistance from developed 
countries to their less developed counterparts (Dang et al., 2009). This has reignited the debate 
over the effects of foreign aid on the development of recipient countries. To this end, whereas a 
recent stream of literature has confirmed the positive impact on development (Gyimah-Brempong 
and Racine, 2014; Kargbo and Sen, 2014), another strand motivated by the recent financial crisis 
has seriously questioned aid effectiveness (Marglin, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Banuri, 2013; Krause, 
2013; Titumir and Kamal, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Monni and Spaventa, 2013; Asongu, 
2014a, 2015a). Some of the conclusions have included, inter alia: neo-colonialism as the prime 
motivation of foreign aid  to less developed countries (Amin, 2014); the entrapment of African 
within neo-colonial webs (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013); the need to strategically limit overly foreign 
aid  reliance from developed countries (Kindiki, 2011);  the imperative for foreign aid policies to 
be based on the needs of recipient nations (Obeng-Odoom, 2013) and the questionable economics 
of development assistance for inclusive human development (Asongu, 2014b).  
 According to Dang et al. (2009), with the recent global economic downturn, international 
aid to the developing world has decreased by an average of 20 to 25 percent. The fact that donors 
may be less able or willing to meet aid promises and engagements during crises results in 
significant macroeconomic instabilities/challenges for high aid-dependent developing countries. 
While such instabilities in foreign aid may be viewed in a negative light by recipients, there is an 
evolving stream of literature suggesting the contrary (see Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004, 2005; 
Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009; Eubank, 2012). For example,  Eubank 
(2012) remarked that in the absence of aid, political accountability is improved in recipient 
countries  on the presumption that the population is willing to consent to paying more taxes in 
exchange for greater political representation. The Eubank Somaliland-based assumption has been 
confirmed for the entire African continent by Asongu (2015b) from the perspective of political 
governance.  
 The contribution of the present line of inquiry to improving scholarly understanding of the 
debate is twofold. First, we change ‘the absence of aid’ to ‘aid instability’ because, with the 
exception of Somaliland, most developing countries are receiving official development assistance 
(ODA). Hence, a more appropriate concern underpinning the debate should be the role of aid 
instabilities on political accountability in recipient nations. Second, we do no limit the concept of 
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governance to political accountability, but extend it to dynamics of political governance (voice & 
accountability and political stability/non violence), economic governance (regulation quality and 
government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-control) and 
general governance (political, economic and institutional governance).  
 As far as we have reviewed, Kangoye (2013) is closest to the present line of inquiry. The 
paper concludes: “This paper examines the effects of aid on governance from a different 
perspective by asserting that aid unpredictability can potentially increase corruption in recipient 
countries by providing incentives to risk-averse and corrupt political leaders to engage in rent-
seeking activities. Analyses of data from 80 developing countries over the period 1984–2004 
offers evidence that higher aid unpredictability is associated with more corruption as measured 
by a synthetic index. We also ﬁnd further evidence that this latter impact is more severe in 
countries with weak initial institutional conditions. These ﬁndings are a supplementary advocacy 
for the need for better management and better predictability of aid ﬂows to  developing 
countries” (p. 121).  
Noticeably, the present paper steers clear of Kangoye (2013) by: (i) not conceiving the 
concept of governance in terms of corruption and (ii) elucidating the ‘aid instability’-governance 
nexus using the Eubank conclusions. Hence, the control of corruption is only an aspect of 
institutional governance. First, restricting the concept of governance to corruption could be 
misleading. Accordingly, while corruption is employed as the dependent variable of interest, 
governance is used on the title. Consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010) as recently employed in 
the literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Andrés et al., 2015), we rethink the concept of 
governance into  (i) political (voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), (ii) 
economic (governance effectiveness and regulation quality), (iii) institutional (corruption-control 
and rule of law) and (iv) general (political, economic and institutional). Second, after the Bottom 
Billion (Collier, 2007) and Dead Aid (Moyo, 2009), inter alia, that have been critically engaged 
in academic and policy making circles, the Eubank (2012) Somaliland-based deduction has been 
recently celebrated with the best paper award from the Journal of Development Studies in 2013.  
It is important to note that the conclusions of Eubank are not quite new because there is a 
substantial bulk of literature that has been devoted to assessing the nexuses between 
accountability and government dependence on local tax income (see Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004, 
2005; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009).Consistent with the narrative, the 
5 
 
government depends on local taxpayers for revenue in exchange for better governance standards. 
Hence, according to the narrative, taxpayers have the leverage to demand better governance 
standards in exchange for compliance with their tax obligations. The theoretical underpinnings of 
the hypothesis are deeply rooted in the history of economic thought. It has foundations in 
negotiations between autocratic governments who needed tax income (to survive inter-state wars) 
and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation if there was better governance and 
delivery of public goods and services.   
In light of the above, the testable hypothesis in this study is simple and easy to follow: 
foreign aid instability may increase governance standards in recipient countries because in the 
presence of such volatility, tax payers are only willing to pay more taxes in exchange for better  
government (political, economic and institutional). The underpinnings of this hypothesis, while 
consistent with Eubank (2012), run counter to the findings of Kangoye (2013). Given that the 
Eubank proposition is based on ‘aid unavailability’, its extension to ‘aid instability’ is qualified as 
an ‘extended Eubank conclusions throughout the paper. The rest of the study is organized as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of 
results are covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with implications and future directions.  
 
 
2. Aid instability and clarification of governance  
2.1 Aid unpredictability: views and assumptions  
 We devote some space to discussing: (i) some summary insights into the nature of 
instability in the international aid system; (ii) why/how aid instability might influence recipient 
governments and (iii) the assumption of ‘aid volatility’ as ‘aid instability’.  
 According to Kangoye (2003) in the first strand, some sources of aid can be unstable for a 
plethora of reasons. They are: (i) Aid may be unstable because the approval of aid disbursements 
is from multiple actors (e.g., parliamentary versus executive powers). (ii) The economic/financial 
conditions of donors may change because of multiple factors, inter alia: negative economic 
shocks like global financial/economic crisis. (iii) Donor priorities for  recipient countries may 
change owing to unstable events like natural catastrophes in some of them, such that more (less) 
aid is disbursed to affected (non-affected) recipients. The above factors may be sources of 
variations between commitments and actual disbursements. According to the authors, aid flows 
are less predictable in nations that are not strongly covered by the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) programs. Moreover, Lemma (2004) has established that in some aid categories, only a 
small fraction (about 12% in certain cases) of initial disbursements eventually trickle-down to 
recipient countries themselves.   
 In the second strand, the underlying gap between commitment and actual disbursements 
affect aid-dependent countries in a multitude of ways, notably in their domestic macroeconomic 
management and development programs (Kangoye, 2013). Some documented consequences of 
‘aid instability’ on recipient governments include: (i) the difficulty in fiscal planning for the 
nation’s development based on the assumption that government planning may be long-term while 
aid commitments are short-run; (ii) monetary and fiscal instability; (iii) pro-cyclicality in aid 
which increases volatility in economic output and (iv) an increase in political accountability due 
to more reliance on domestic taxation for public income. While the first-two points are from 
Kangoye (2013), the third and fourth points are respectively from Lensink and Morrissey (2000) 
and Asongu (2015b).  The third point is consistent with Lensink and Morrissey  because they 
have argued that it is difficult establishing a significant growth effect from aid unless some 
indicator capturing instability in aid is factored into the regression. Conversely, predictability of 
aid can create over dependence of recipients on donors.  
 In the underlying literature, Lensink and Morrissey (op.cit) have used the term instability 
interchangeably with uncertainty whereas Kangoye (op.cit) has used instability interchangeably 
with unpredictability. We prefer to use the term ‘instability’ interchangeably with ‘volatility’ 
because equating volatility with  unpredictability may not be a perfectly defensible assumption. 
This is essentially because the underlying equation is based on the hypotheses that: (i) there is  a 
constant stream of aid flows and (ii) the sources of volatility are not the result of an aid program 
stopping in a predictable manner. In essence, the implicit assumption that volatility implies 
unpredictability is short of substance. This is because, whereas volatility may result from events 
like the global economic crisis (which is not predictable for the most part), volatility may also 
result from aid programmes starting and stopping in an entirely predictable manner.  
 
2.2 Clarification of governance  
  
 This section is devoted to clarifying the concept of governance adopted. We discuss it in 
two principal strands, notably: definitions of governance and debates surrounding the governance 
concepts to be adopted in the paper.   
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 The perception of governance is complex and multidimensional and can take several 
definitions (Asongu, 2016).  First, according to Dixit (2009), economic governance can be 
defined as  ‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic 
activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contract, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure’(p.5). Second, Tusalem 
(2015) understands governance as consisting of regulation quality, political stability, rule of law, 
bureaucratic effectiveness and corruption-control. Third, Fukuyama (2013) has said that 
governance should comprehensively embody four principal measures, namely: bureaucratic 
measures, procedural measures, output measures and capacity indicators which entail both 
professionalism and resources. Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, the most widely employed 
governance indicators in the literature are from Kaufmann et al. (2010). These consist of three 
main governance categories: institutional, economic and political governances. (i) Institutional 
governance is defined as respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions 
between them. It is measured with two variables: corruption-control and the rule of law. (ii) 
Economic governance is defined as the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public goods and services. It is also measured with two indicators: regulation quality and 
government effectiveness. (iii) Political governance is defined as the election and replacement of 
political leaders. It is measured with two main indicators: political stability/no violence and voice 
and accountability.  
 In spite of some criticisms that have arisen in policy-making and scholarly circles, 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have promptly responded with rebuttals to defend the 
confidence enjoyed by the underlying governance variables in scholarly circles. As far as we 
have reviewed, one of the most interesting debates has been with Andrew Schrank and Marcus 
Kurtz. The reader can find more insights into the highlighted debate in: ‘models, measures and 
mechanisms’  (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a); a reply (Kaufmann et al., 2007a); a defense (Kurtz & 
Schrank, 2007b)  and a rejoinder (Kaufmann et al., 2007a). In light of the debate, we have found 
the reply and rejoinder from Kaufmann et al. (2007ab) very informative on the quality of 
governance indicators from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. In this light, the 
study adopts the governance indicators from Kaufmann et al: consistent with a recent stream of 
literature on unbundling (Gani, 2011; Andrés et al., 2014; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Yerrabit & 
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Hawkes, 2015) and bundling (Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015) governance 
dynamics.   
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 We examine a sample of fifty three African countries using annual data from the African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. Good governance 
indicators from the World Bank are only available from 1996. The focus on the African continent 
has a twofold justification. It is (i) consistent with developing countries to which the findings of 
Kangoye are relevant and (ii) in line with the Eubank (2012) hypothesis which has been 
postulated theoretical/literally and confirmed empirically in Africa (Asongu, 2015b).  
The choice of three non-overlapping intervals (NOI) has a fourfold justification.  First, 
one degree of freedom is lost after computation of residuals in the first-order autoregressive 
processes and at least two periods are needed for standard deviations of the corresponding 
residuals to be further computed. Second, averages mitigate short-run or business cycle 
disturbances that may loom substantially large. Third, three  year NOI ensure that the basic 
conditions for the employment of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) are  satisfied (N>T: 
53>5). Fourth, 3 year NOI restrict overidentification or limit instrument proliferation by ensuring 
that the numbers of cross-sections are higher than the number of instruments in each 
specification.  
 The dependent variables are governance dynamics (political, economic, institutional and 
general). They are obtained from principal component analysis (PCA) discussed in Section 3.2.1 
below.  
 The independent variable of interest is net official development assistance as a percentage  
of Gross Domestic Product (NODA). In order to add subtlety to the analysis for robustness 
purposes, we add: (i) NODA from the Development Assistance Committee as a percentage  of 
GDP (NODADAC) and (ii) NODA from Multilateral donors as a percentage of GDP 
(NODAMD). The instabilities are computed using two approaches: (i) simple standard deviations 
of three-year intervals and (ii) standard errors or standard deviations of the saved residuals after 
first-order autoregressive processes in the NODA dynamics. The latter approach is consistent 
with Kangoye (op.cit). As we have emphasized in Section 2.1, we equate volatility with 
9 
 
instability in the study. Two points are worth noting in the computation of instability. First, the 
second measurement of instability (from standard errors) is motivated by the need to distinguish 
simple variations (from the first measurement) with more unstable factors. Therefore, more 
unstable changes in aid flows are captured by the second measurement of aid instability. Second, 
the study uses two year averages for the computation of standard errors (after a loss of one degree 
of freedom from first autoregressive processes). The corresponding low order of non-overlapping 
intervals enables the study to limit the mitigation of short-run or business cycle disturbances that 
are essential to capture instability as much as possible. Therefore, with scholarly modesty in 
mind, contrary to the Kangoye (2013) computation which based on ten year data averages, with 
three-year data averages, the approach in this study limits the mitigation of the short-run 
disturbances that are required to better compute instability.  
 We control for inflation, trade openness, economic prosperity and government 
expenditure. Whereas the role of government expenditure is consistent with fiscal behavior in 
governance (Eubank, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013), globalization in terms of trade openness has 
been documented to improve governance (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Asongu, 2014c). 
Economic prosperity and income-levels are instrumental in the quality of government (Asongu, 
2012, p. 191). The sign of inflation on governance remains ambiguous. It may be positive if the 
measures put in place are designed to effectively improve government quality and correct the 
problem. On the other hand, it could substantially affect governance standards negatively if issues 
of soaring food prices remain unaddressed. The latter constitute factors that culminated in the 
“Arab Spring” (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). We also employ time-effects in the specifications 
to further control for unobserved heterogeneity. It is important to note that, whereas dummy or 
fixed effects like legal origins have been documented to affect the quality of governance 
(Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014), unfortunately we cannot control for dummy variables in the 
GMM specification because these are eliminated by first differencing for the difference equation 
of the system GMM.  
 Definition of the variables is presented in Appendix 1, the summary statistics disclosed in 
Appendix 2 and the correlation analysis in Appendix 3. From the summary statistics it can be 
observed that variables are comparable and from their corresponding variations we can be 
confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. The correlation analysis has 
been employed to mitigate multicollinearity and overparameterization issues that could arise. 
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These are apparent among NODA instability dynamics.  We also notice from the summary 
statistics that the computed ‘aid volatiles’ are quite large. Accordingly, for the most part, the 
variances of ‘aid instability’ indicators are as substantial as those of baseline aid variables.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
 This section extends the definition of governance from corruption to political, economic, 
institutional and general dynamics. We use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensions of each governance dynamic because some information may be redundant owing to 
the high degrees of substitution. PCA is a widely employed statistical method that consists of 
reducing a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components that reflect a substantial variation or proportion of initial information. We 
first reduce all the governance indicators to obtain a general governance measurement before 
further mitigating them into: (i) voce & accountability and political stability for political 
governance (PolGov), (ii) government effectiveness and regulation quality for economic 
governance (EcoGov) and (iii) corruption-control and rule of law for institutional governance 
(InstGov).  
 The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion are employed to determine common 
factors. They recommend stopping at first principal components (PCs) with an eigen value 
greater than the mean (or unity). In this light, as shown in Table 1 below: General governance 
(G.Gov) has an eigenvalue of 4.642 and represents more than 77 percent of variation in the six 
government variables (regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, rule of 
law, political stability/no violence and voice and  accountability); political governance (PolGov) 
summarizes about 82 percent of information with an eigenvalue of 1.852; economic governance 
denotes more than 90 percent of information with an eigenvalue of 1.812 and; institutional 
governance represents 93.5 percent of variability with a 1.871 eigenvalue. Consistent with 
Andrés et al. (2014), the following definitions are relevant to  governance dynamics: (i) Political 
governance is the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced. (ii) Economic 
governance denotes the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies as well as 
deliver services.   (iii) Institutional governance represents the respect for citizens and the state of 
institutions that govern the interactions among them.   
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 0.773 4.642 
Second  PC 0.297 0.774 -0.369 -0.350 -0.021 -0.230 0.077 0.851 0.466 
Third PC 0.750 -0.300 0.353 -0.127 -0.223 -0.396 0.066 0.917 0.398 
          
First PC (PolGov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.170 1.000 0.340 
          
First PC (EcoGov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
          
First PC (InstGov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political 
Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. PolGov (Political Governance): First 
PC of VA & PS. EcoGov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. InstGov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
 
 Consistent with the underlying literature on bundling institutions (Asongu, 2016; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2015), is it relevant to engage some issues that might arise in the validity of 
estimated coefficients from PC-augmented regressions. The concerns, to the best of our 
knowledge, were first raised by Pagan (1984, p.242) who established that three main anxieties are 
linked to the use of estimates from initial regressions in second-stage modeling, namely concerns 
about efficiency, consistency and inferential validity of estimations. Pagan argues that whereas 
estimates from two-step estimation processes are efficient and consistent, not all corresponding 
inferences are valid. The issue about inferences broadly aligns with an abundant supply of 
literature that has focused on the same issue, notably: Oxley and McAleer (1993), McKenzie and 
McAleer (1997), Ba and Ng (2006) and Westerlund and Urbain  (2012, 2013ab).  
 Narrowing-down the perspective to the specific framework of the PC-derived indicators 
employed in this study, to the best of our knowledge Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have 
provided insights into how the concern about inferential validity can be tackled. The authors have 
built on more contemporary literature (Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Pesaran, 2006; Bai, 
2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012) in order to sustain that normal inferences can be 
established with PC regressors provided that the estimated coefficients converge to their 
corresponding real values at the rate  NT   with N (T) as  the number of cross-sections (time 
series). While the authors have articulated that for convergence to be feasible N and T need to be 
sufficiently large, they have stopped short of  elucidating how ‘large is large’. Within the specific 
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framework of this inquiry, we are faced with three major issues. First, N cannot be stretched 
further because we have included all existing fifty three African countries, with the exception of 
South Sudan for which data was  not available before 2011. Second, we cannot extend T to a date 
before 1996 because good governance variables from the World Bank Governance indicators are 
only available therefrom . Third, we cannot employ annual periodicities so as to extend T because 
of analytical and methodological constraints. On the analytical front, the calibration of aid 
instabilities (standard errors) require that we use at least three non-overlapping intervals so that 
(i) one degree of freedom is lost after the first autoregressive process and (ii) at least two degrees 
of freedom are required for the computation of standard errors (or standard deviations of 
corresponding residuals). At the methodological level, a basic requirement for the adopted GMM 
technique is that N>T. Hence using non-overlapping intervals also enables the study to limit 
instrument proliferation or over-identification. Above all, recent literature on bundling 
institutions (albeit with lower values of N and T) has established that inferences with bundled 
governance indicators are equally valid (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu, 2016).   
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
 The system GMM estimation strategy is adopted for a threefold interest: (i) it accounts for 
some potential endogeneity
1
; (ii) cross-country regressions are eliminated in the estimation 
process and (iii) biases in the difference estimation resulting from small samples are mitigated. 
Hence it is substantially for this third point that we are consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) 
in choosing the system GMM approach (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) 
instead of the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In the specification, a 
heteroscedasticity-consistent two-step approach is preferred to the homoscedasticity-consistent 
one-step procedure. Two tests are performed to ascertain the validity of the models, notably:  (i) 
the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity and (ii) the Arellano 
and Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. The 
interests of using data averages in terms of three  year NOI have already been discussed in the 
data section.  
                                                 
1
 In essence, the system GMM controls for: (i) autoregressive endogeneity in the dependent variables by exploiting 
all orthogonality conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and error terms; (ii) simultaneity by 
instrumenting the regressors with the first lagged and first differences and (iii) time-invariant omitted variables with 
time fixed effects.  
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 The following equations in levels and first difference represent the GMM approach.    
titi
j
tijtititititi XMDDACTGovGov ,
4
1
,,4,3,21,10,   

                    (1)       
)()()( 1,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititi DACDACTTGovGovGovGov   
  )()()( 1,,1
4
1
1,,1,,4 

   tititt
j
titijtiti XXMDMD                                     (2) 
 
 Where: ‘t’ denotes the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. Gov  is Governance; T , Total 
NODA; DAC , NODA from DAC countries; MD , NODA from Multilateral Donors; X is the set 
of control variables (Trade openness, Government expenditure, Inflation and GDP growth); 
i is a country-specific effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. The 
estimation procedure involves jointly estimating the regression in levels (Eq. [1]) with that in 
first-difference (Eq. (2)), hence exploiting all the parallel or orthogonality conditions between the 
error term and the lagged endogenous variable.  
 
4. Empirical results  
 
 While Section 4.1 presents the findings with foreign aid instability as standard deviations, 
Section 4.2 reveals robustness checks with foreign aid instability as standard errors (standard 
deviations of the residuals after first-order autoregressive processes). We observe that the post-
estimation diagnostics test confirms the validity of the models for the most part. Accordingly, 
two tests have been performed to investigate the validity of these models, notably:  the Arellano 
and Bond autocorrelation test which investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the 
Sargan-test that assesses the over-identification restrictions. The latter test investigates if the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis 
of this test is the view that the instruments as a group display strict exogeneity or do not suffer 
from endogeneity.  Overwhelmingly for most models, we have neither rejected the AR(2) null 
hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation nor the Sargan null for the validity of the 
instruments. 
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4.1 Instability as standard deviations 
 
 Table 2 below assesses the concerns underpinning the paper using the first definition of 
instabilities which is the standard deviation of three-year NOI. But for a thin exception (first 
model on general governance with a significant Sargan OIR test), the models are overwhelmingly 
valid because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most 
part. The main findings support the extended Eubank conclusions with a positive effect of aid 
instabilities on political and general governance. Most of the control variables have the expected 
though insignificant signs.  
   
Table 2: Total foreign aid instability with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.970*** 1.128*** 1.081*** 0.862*** 0.854*** 0.913*** 1.040*** 0.955*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.067 -0.145 -0.041 -0.007 0.048 0.063 0.008 -0.088 
 (0.358) (0.177) (0.701) (0.963) (0.572) (0.673) (0.944) (0.634) 
NODASD1 (Total) 0.006* 0.015* 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.017** 0.017* 
 (0.054) (0.075) (0.251) (0.582) (0.482) (0.350) (0.044) (0.056) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.004 --- 0.0008 --- 0.009 
  (0.324)  (0.539)  (0.865)  (0.225) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.018 --- 0.004 --- 0.019 
  (0.217)  (0.240)  (0.786)  (0.383) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0005 --- -0.0003 --- 0.0007 
  (0.831)  (0.668)  (0.797)  (0.634) 
Inflation   --- 0.0009 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0007 
  (0.139)  (0.571)  (0.233)  (0.393) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.550) (0.614) (0.395) (0.701) (0.389) (0.300) (0.524) (0.338) 
Sargan OIR (0.599) (0.290) (0.029) (0.196) (0.115) (0.297) (0.071) (0.252) 
Wald  (joint) 91.426*** 953.30*** 102.44*** 1084.3*** 79.441*** 1339.6*** 168.15*** 3076.3*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODA S.D1(Total): Distortions by Simple Standard 
Deviation. 
 
  
 In Table 3 below, specifications of Table 2 are replicated with NODA from DAC 
countries (Panel A) and NODA from Multilateral Donors (Panel B). The models in both panels 
are overwhelmingly valid and the extended Eubank is also confirmed from political and general 
governance perspectives.  
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Table 3: DAC and MD foreign aid instability with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
 Panel A: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
Gov (-1) 0.992*** 1.131*** 1.084*** 0.835*** 0.843*** 0.919*** 1.035*** 0.963*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.054 -0.160 -0.044 0.009 0.055 0.081 0.022 -0.081 
 (0.467) (0.140) (0.677) (0.952) (0.526) (0.581) (0.844) (0.670) 
NODADACSD1  0.002 0.019*** 0.016 0.005 0.0009 0.004 0.019* 0.016** 
 (0.541) (0.000) (0.249) (0.714) (0.844) (0.513) (0.092) (0.041) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.004 --- 0.0007 --- 0.009 
  (0.299)  (0.617)  (0.873)  (0.216) 
GDP growth  --- 0.013 --- 0.019 --- 0.004 --- 0.019 
  (0.188)  (0.223)  (0.771)  (0.357) 
Trade  --- 0.0003 --- 0.0006 --- -0.0004 --- 0.0006 
  (0.752)  (0.605)  (0.740)  (0.686) 
Inflation   --- 0.001* --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.084)  (0.530)  (0.272)  (0.355) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.646) (0.669) (0.338) (0.682) (0.383) (0.296) (0.560) (0.333) 
Sargan OIR (0.536) (0.281) (0.032) (0.199) (0.120) (0.330) (0.075) (0.244) 
Wald  (joint) 50.416*** 1245.2*** 112.70*** 1085.5*** 48.786*** 1674.0*** 150.14*** 2994*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 55 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
         
 Panel B: Foreign Aid from Multilateral Donors 
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.872*** 1.115*** 1.047*** 0.882*** 0.834*** 0.971*** 1.005*** 0.947*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.078 -0.106 -0.041 -0.037 0.039 0.155 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.284) (0.378) (0.705) (0.807) (0.644) (0.309) (0.904) (0.903) 
NODAMDSD1 0.039*** 0.011 0.025** 0.039 0.013 0.009 0.052*** 0.032 
 (0.000) (0.748) (0.044) (0.422) (0.211) (0.724) (0.000) (0.493) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.004 --- 0.003 --- 0.001 --- 0.007 
  (0.390)  (0.646)  (0.711)  (0.283) 
GDP growth  --- 0.013 --- 0.020 --- -0.002 --- 0.017 
  (0.224)  (0.194)  (0.865)  (0.462) 
Trade  --- 0.0001 --- 0.0004 --- -0.001 --- 0.0006 
  (0.881)  (0.694)  (0.465)  (0.723) 
Inflation   --- 0.0001 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.743)  (0.300)  (0.178)  (0.678) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.519) (0.700) (0.605) (0.902) (0.406) (0.339) (0.633) (0.364) 
Sargan OIR (0.562) (0.250) (0.035) (0.319) (0.114) (0.562) (0.059) (0.396) 
Wald  (joint) 59.108*** 733.31*** 156.94*** 1280.6*** 74.766*** 1051.6*** 153.56*** 2885*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
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bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADAC SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation.       
 
 
4.2 Robustness checks:  instability as standard errors  
 
 Tables 4 and 5 below address the underlying problem using standard errors as instabilities 
instead of standard deviations. The standard errors are computed as the standard deviations of the 
residuals saved from the first-order autoregressive processes. The extended Eubank conclusion is 
broadly confirmed for political and general governance.  
 
Table 4: Total foreign aid instability with standard errors  
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.969*** 1.128*** 1.078*** 0.828*** 0.841*** 0.915*** 1.034*** 0.938*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.057 -0.147 -0.025 0.012 0.055 0.078 0.030 -0.068 
 (0.431) (0.165) (0.815) (0.938) (0.513) (0.593) (0.785) (0.691) 
NODA SD2 (Total) 0.003** 0.012** 0.005 0.002 0.0006 0.002 0.009 0.008 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.468) (0.811) (0.804) (0.514) (0.178) (0.167) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.003 --- 0.0008 --- 0.008 
  (0.333)  (0.633)  (0.861)  (0.238) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.020 --- 0.004 --- 0.021 
  (0.198)  (0.216)  (0.777)  (0.330) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0007 ---  -0.0004 --- 0.0009 
  (0.845)  (0.573)  (0.775)  (0.529) 
Inflation   --- 0.001 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0003 
  (0.119)  (0.457)  (0.267)  (0.689) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.655) (0.673) (0.524) (0.687) (0.381) (0.294) (0.765) (0.307) 
Sargan OIR (0.596) (0.308) (0.024) (0.228) (0.120) (0.350) (0.053) (0.290) 
Wald  (joint) 82.210*** 1065.2*** 84.379*** 1026.0*** 49.500*** 1487.1*** 133.72*** 3105*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODAS.D2 (Total): SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation 
of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: DAC and MD foreign aid instability with standard errors  
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
 Panel A: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
Gov (-1) 0.985*** 1.131*** 1.078*** 0.810*** 0.838*** 0.917*** 1.032*** 0.950*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.050 -0.149 -0.031 0.021 0.056 0.081 0.035 -0.075 
 (0.499) (0.170) (0.771) (0.890) (0.513) (0.573) (0.750) (0.677) 
NODADAC SD2  0.002 0.013** 0.009 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.011 0.010* 
 (0.412) (0.014) (0.389) (0.825) (0.935) (0.564) (0.223) (0.097) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.003 --- 0.0007 --- 0.008 
  (0.306)  (0.683)  (0.873)  (0.220) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.020 --- 0.004 --- 0.021 
  (0.194)  (0.229)  (0.742)  (0.307) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0007 --- -0.0004 --- 0.0007 
  (0.796)  (0.555)  (0.746)  (0.604) 
Inflation   --- 0.001* --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0006 
  (0.099)  (0.464)  (0.273)  (0.504) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.681) (0.684) (0.466) (0.659) (0.382) (0.293) (0.778) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR (0.527) (0.288) (0.027) (0.205) (0.125) (0.360) (0.060) (0.269) 
Wald  (joint) 52.18*** 1318.2*** 95.147*** 1019.6*** 37.637*** 1818.7*** 130.29*** 3194.3*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
         
 Panel B: Foreign Aid from Multilateral Donors 
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.916*** 1.135*** 1.053*** 0.849*** 0.818*** 0.962*** 0.990*** 0.934*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.089 -0.157 -0.047 -0.002 0.044 0.141 -0.013 -0.029 
 (0.243) (0.149) (0.682) (0.989) (0.596) (0.343) (0.913) (0.852) 
NODAMD SD2 0.042*** 0.043 0.020 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.048*** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.116) (0.111) (0.807) (0.385) (0.612) (0.000) (0.591) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.004 --- 0.003 --- 0.001 --- 0.007 
  (0.345)  (0.570)  (0.713)  (0.229) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.021 --- -0.002 --- 0.019 
  (0.257)  (0.166)  (0.890)  (0.408) 
Trade  --- 0.000 --- 0.0006 --- -0.001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.977)  (0.569)  (0.489)  (0.593) 
Inflation   --- 0.0006 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.261)  (0.304)  (0.210)  (0.743) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.762) (0.652) (0.559) (0.765) (0.416) (0.328) (0.654) (0.331) 
Sargan OIR (0.458) (0.347) (0.030) (0.294) (0.125) (0.550) (0.049) (0.370) 
Wald  (joint) 43.24*** 981.65*** 92.29*** 1052.5*** 35.313*** 1174.1*** 100.18*** 3054.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
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bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADACSD2:  SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation of the Residuals 
after first-order autoregressive processes. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors.  
 
5. Concluding implications  
 
 The recent global economic crisis has substantially reduced the foreign aid commitment 
and ability of developed countries towards their less developed counterparts. Despite the evolving 
literature that such instability is not favourable to recipient countries; building on the Eubank 
conclusions on ‘aid unavailability’ we have verified the hypothesis on how ‘aid instability’ 
affects governance standards in recipient countries. Our findings broadly confirm the Eubank 
amended Eubank conclusions. Hence, foreign aid instability may increase governance standards 
in recipient countries because, in the presence of such volatility, tax payers are only willing to 
pay more taxes in exchange for better government. As a policy implication, reduction in aid may 
not be al together a bad omen for recipient countries. It may simply push governments to adopt 
better governance standards in view of anticipating more tax revenues from the population. It 
follows that there is a positive association between ‘more taxation’ and greater ‘political 
representation and better delivery of public commodities’.  
 By extending the hypothesis, we have also clarified the findings of Kangoye (2013) 
which, to the best of our knowledge, are the closest in the literature to the present line of inquiry. 
In essence, Kangoye has limited the conception of governance to corruption. Hence, by 
employing a more holistic definition and measurement of governance, we have confirmed the 
Eubank conclusions, using the same measurement of instability as Kangoye. As a policy 
implication, it is important to clearly articulate the concept of governance in applied 
econometrics in order to avoid misleading policy implications.  
 We have also observed that the effect of foreign aid instability is positively significant on 
general governance, while for the most part, it is not consistently significant in stimulating 
economic and institutional governance. Two implications derive from this finding. First, general 
governance may be substantially driven by political governance when it comes to the effect of aid 
instabilities. This may be because, in light of the extended Eubank conclusions, the population 
may be more sensitive to ‘taxation for political representation, voice and accountability’, relative 
to economic and institutional governance. Second, the aggregation of governance indicators 
improves insights into how macroeconomic variables affect governance. Hence, as opposed to 
Kangoye who has reduced the concept of governance to corruption, conceiving, defining and 
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measuring governance more inclusively in applied econometrics is relevant to advancing the 
scholarship on aid and institutions.  
 An alternative explanation to the findings is that nations with improving governments are 
also entitled to substantial increases in aid, given that ‘aid volatility’ is correlated with improving 
governance variables provided that the trend is not just a first-order autoregressive process. This 
possibility is broadly consistent with Van de Walle (2001). 
 Two main caveats are clearly apparent from the study. First, due to methodological 
constraints, we are unable to control for thresholds in foreign aid dependency. In this light, the 
effect on governance in low and high aid-dependent (e.g Mozambique) countries cannot easily be 
disassociated. Moreover, the measure of aid instability might miss country-specific volatility 
characteristics and linear trends. We cannot control for these factors because of concerns about 
instrument proliferation or overidentification. Accordingly, given that the basic requirement for 
the GMM approach is N>T, the use of sub-samples leads to  pre-estimation N<T and post-
estimation instrument proliferation. Hence, future studies could focus on accounting for aid 
dependency thresholds as well as country-specific cases in order to improve on the extant 
literature on established nexuses.  Second, while the study has performed robustness checks by 
using different governance and aid variables, it would be worthwhile to use different indicators of 
governance and ‘aid intensity’ in future studies. Insights into this second point are documented in 
Kangoye (2013). These recommendations are consistent with the need to account for more 
heterogeneity in foreign aid inquiries (Asiedu & Nandwa, 2007; Asiedu, 2014). 
 Addressing the above concerns would enrich the debate and clarify the growing 
confidence of officials in some less aid-dependent countries. In essence, at a recent African 
mining conference, Hussein Abdi Dualeh (Somaliland’s minister of energy and minerals) 
professed that his country did not need foreign aid because it was better-off without it:  “That is a 
blessing in disguise. Aid never developed anything…Aid is not a panacea, we’d rather not have 
it….How many African countries do you know that developed because of a lot of aid? It’s a 
curse. The ones that get the most aid are the ones with the problems….We’ve been left to our own 
devices. We are our own people and our own guys. We pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps. 
We owe absolutely nothing to anybody. We would not change hands with Greece today. We have 
zero debt” (Stoddard, 2014). This leaves room for further research on country-specific cases.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Aid1: NODASD1 (Total)  Instability of Total NODA by Simple Standard Deviation  Author 
   
Aid 2: NODADACSD1 Instability of NODADAC by Simple Standard Deviation.  
 
Author 
Aid 3: NODAMDSD1 Instability of NODAMD by Simple Standard Deviation 
 
Author 
Aid1: NODASD2 (Total)  Instability of Total NODA by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
Aid 2: NODADACSD2 Instability of NODADAC by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
Aid 3: NODAMDSD2 Instability of NODAMD by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
   
Political Stability  “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Voice & Accountability  “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Political Governance  “First Principal Component of Political Stability and 
Voice & Accountability. The process by which those in 
authority are selected and replaced”. 
           PCA 
   
Government Effectiveness “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Regulation Quality  “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Economic Governance  “First Principal Component of Government 
Effectiveness and Regulation Quality. The capacity of 
government to formulate & implement policies, and to 
deliver services”.  
              PCA 
   
Rule of Law “Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Corruption Control  “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which publicpower is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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private interests”.  
   
Institutional Governance  “First Principal Component of Rule of Law and 
Corruption-Control. The respect for citizens and the state 
of institutions that govern the interactions among them” 
PCA 
   
General Governance   First principal component of Political Stability, Voice & 
Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulation 
Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption-Control.  
PCA 
2   
   
GDP growth  Gross Domestic Product growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Government Expenditure  Government Final Consumption Expenditure(% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. NODAMD: NODA from 
Multilateral Donors. SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after 
first-order autoregressive processes.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Total NODA 10.889 12.029 0.015 102.97 253 
Total NODADAC 6.278 7.303 -0.003 68.063 253 
Total NODADMD 4.525 5.083 0.004 33.249 253 
First Instability from Total NODA 2.841 6.460 0.001 64.113 250 
First Instability from Total NODADAC 1.868 4.790 0.0005 44.404 250 
First Instability from Total NODADMD 1.397 2.712 0.0006 29.353 250 
Second  Instability  from Total NODA 3.409 8.106 0.005 91.927 250 
Second  Instability from Total NODADAC 2.201 6.333 0.001 68.826 250 
Second  Instability from Total NODADMD 1.678 2.714 0.000 29.906 250 
Political Governance (PolGov) -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Economic Governance (EcoGov)  0.049 1.310 -3.019 3.290 254 
Institutional Governance (InstGov)  0.008 1.378 -3.879 3.179 264 
General Governance (G.Gov)  0.108 2.095 -5.139 5.086 254 
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 3.005 1.064 1.066 6.100 181 
GDP growth   4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee. SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Instability by Standard 
Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
                
Control Variables Foreign Aid Instabilities Governance   
GDPg Trade Gov.E Inflation SD1Aid1 SD1Aid2 SD1Aid3 SD2Aid1 SD2Aid2 SD2Aid3 PolGov EcoGov InstGov G.Gov  Corruption   
1.000 0.179 0.254 -0.132 0.219 0.193 0.166 0.145 0.091 0.109 -0.012 -0.041 -0.084 -0.049 -0.056 GDPg 
 1.000 -0.070 0.024 0.082 0.050 0.047 0.105 0.091 -0.032 0.202 0.089 0.207 0.174 0.209 Trade 
  1.000 -0.243 0.014 0.024 0.072 0.028 0.028 0.051 -0.040 0.007 0.023 -0.003 -0.095 Gov. E 
   1.000 -0.004 0.011 -0.016 -0.003 0.006 0.016 -0.114 -0.169 -0.136 -0.149 -0.054 Inflation 
    1.000 0.921 0.793 0.949 0.878 0.678 -0.157 -0.293 -0.215 -0.244 -0.130 SD1Aid1 
     1.000 0.528 0.901 0.946 0.459 -0.160 -0.279 -0.224 -0.242 -0.129 SD1Aid2 
      1.000 0.718 0.515 0.902 -0.105 -0.252 -0.157 -0.191 -0.132 SD1Aid3 
       1.000 0.945 0.650 -0.109 -0.251 -0.179 -0.198 -0.118 SD2Aid1 
        1.000 0.452 -0.115 -0.228 -0.182 -0.191 -0.112 SD2Aid2 
         1.000 -0.074 -0.234 -0.153 -0.175 -0.161 SD2Aid3 
          1.000 0.758 0.819 0.901 0.745 PolGov 
           1.000 0.878 0.945 0.822 EcoGov 
            1.000 0.957 0.895 InstGov 
             1.000 0.875 G.Gov  
              1.000 Corruption 
                
GDPg: GDP growth rate. Gov. E: Government Expenditure. Aid1: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). Aid2: NODA from the DAC countries. Aid3: NODA from Multilateral Donors. 
SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  PolGov: Political Governance. 
EcoGov: Economic Governance. InstGov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance.  
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